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IN REPLY TO MY CRITICS.
BY IHE EDITOK.
THE book Whence afid Whither^ was written for those only who
have had in their lives the unpleasant experience of being
beset with doubts, because confronted with problems which come
to us, not by our own desire, but in the natural course of our
mental growth.
The soul-problem is a religious problem, and our conception
of the soul decidedly affects our religious attitude. The tradi-
tional religion does not enter at all into the theoretical difficulties
of modern psychology and inculcates only some practical results,
expressed in moral rules of an altruistic ethics, which in their main
sentiments no one seriously thinks of controverting. Some popular
notions of the soul fill the gap, and thus it happens that those who
are grounded in their faith are not in need of the explanation and
arguments here set forth ; they possess a surrogate of the truth
which most likely will prove sufficient for them, because adapted
to their special wants; and the truth may positively hurt them.
They need milk and cannot as yet stand stronger diet.
The book has been written for those who are about to reach
the age of mental maturity and suffer from doubt and other maladies
that accompany the period of transition. It is destined for the sick
who need medicine, for the poor in spirit who want information,
for those astray who are seeking the light—who want the truth and
nothing but the truth,—those who have outgrown the infantile
stage of being satisfied with creeds and have ceased to accept a
statement because it is made on the authority of a book or a bishop,
of a father or a teacher, or any other venerable person or body of
persons, churches, or councils.
\ Whence and Whither. An Inquiry Into the Nature of the Soul, Its Origin an,i nettiny. By
Dr. Paul Carus. ChicaKo : The Open Court Pub. Co. 1900.
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The author cherishes the conviction that the old dogmatic for-
mulations of religion contain the truth and are a natural and neces-
sary phase in the religious evolution of mankind. They contain
the truth, but they are not the truth. Creeds are symbols and are
called so by the Church. They are formulations of the truth in
allegorical terms. God is not a father ; he is comparable to a
father. It is the best simile we can find. The Logos or world-
order, which is revealed in the realisation of the morally perfect
man, is not God's physically begotten son, but there is no better
expression than the relation between father and son to denote the
significance of the Christ-idea. There are no angels with wings
flitting between heaven and earth as messengers of God to men
;
but we are surrounded by helpful influences more efficient and
more real than the beings of our own fancy. Last but not least,
man's soul-life and immortality are as real on the basis of the doc-
trines of a genuine psychonomy with its exacter determinations as
on the simple and plain assumptions of the old-fashioned psy-
chology.
The traditional conception of the soul may be characterised as
a materialistic spiritualism, because it materialises the soul as an
entity and regards it as a concrete being consisting of a sublimated
substance. The theory is exploded, but the hearts of those who
have no knowledge of the present state of science still hunger after
the flesh-pots of the old psychological Egypt with its naive mythol-
ogy and all the crude notions implied in it.
Materialistic spiritualism is a natural and necessary phase in
the history of psychological science; its most classical expression
has been worked out by the Vedanta philosophy of the ancient
Brahmans in essays called Upanishads which prepared the way to
Buddhism.
1
The Upanishads are beautiful in thought and elegant in style.
But their underlying idea is an error. The Upanishads materialise
the soul, making it now no larger than the end of the thumb, now
smaller than a grain of rice or a mustard-seed. There are modern
thinkers who outdo the ancient Brahmans.
Some, following Leibnitz, would have the soul be a monad or
an atom; others, following Herbart, would reduce it to a mathe-
matical point, assuming it to be a center of forces or Kraftcenirum.
IThe Upanishads in the form in which we now have them may have been written later and
may have to be assigned to the early centuries after Buddha, but the problems themselves and
the method of discussing them is pre-Buddhistic, for Buddhism is an answer to the problem,
negating the existence of a soul in itself, a self-soul, an ego-entity, an atman.
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We need not say that a dynamical conception of the soul is as
much materialistic as one that makes of it a substance.
Buddhism denied the existence of the atman, but Buddhism,
if it were assumed to deny the existence of the soul, would be as
wrong as Brahman Vedantism. The truth is that the soul exists.
Our soul is our feeling, our thinking, and our willing. But there
is no soul-being, no substance or material entity, which does the
feeling, thinking, and willing. The realities of life remain as real
on the theory of being the phenomenal appearances of metaphys-
ical entities, as they are on the theory that the metaphysical ideas
are fictitious notions invented for the special purpose of compre-
hending the realities of life. Metaphysics in the traditional sense
of the term is now regarded as nothing but an hypostatisation of
words coined for thinking certain groups of events and especially
all the impalpable spiritualities more easily, for manipulating them
with facility, for rendering them concrete and tangible. While
metaphysical notions are fictitious, they are not quite useless; they
have been invented for a purpose, and they hold good if limited to
that purpose.
The problem of the metaphysical existence of the soul is the
old problem of unity. Unity is imposed by the thinking mind
upon a conglomeration of qualities, upon a complex of forces, upon
a heap of material particles. Some concrete bit of reality is sev-
ered in thought from the rest of the world and called a crystal, a
tree, a chair, a planet, a mammal, a soul. In reality these con-
crete things are not stable entities ; they are interrelated with the
conditions under which they exist and continue to exist so long as
these conditions remain. In reality everything is a part of the
surrounding world, and vice versa the surrounding world is a part
of everything. The nature of a planet is determined by the char-
acter of the solar system of which it is a part. A mammal is such
because the planet on which its ancestors have lived shaped its
constitution. It is moulded by its surroundings and represents
the sum total of all the inherited reactions toward them of its an-
cestral life.
The unity of things is never a concrete reality, yet it is real.
It is a fiction of the thinking mind, but it is neither an illusion nor
an error. It is justified for the purpose for which it has been in-
vented. The invention of names and the imposition of unity upon
the things named is not arbitrary. Though things are in a constant
flux coming into existence, changing while they exist, and passing
out of existence again, the combination of certain parts or forces
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produces a new thing, and we can very well temporarily treat their
combination as if it were stable, for it possesses certain new fea-
tures which are not contained in any one of its parts. As soon as
the combination is realised the thing appears.
The clock is not in the pendulum, nor in the weight, nor in
cogs and wheels, but originates by a complete and proper com-
bination of all parts. The same is true of the steam-engine and
the dynamo, as well as organisms.
The type of the thing (its idea) is eternal but the realised thing
is a fleeting event. The idea is perfect, it is the eternal thought
of God, of the creator, of the factors that shape the world. The
fleeting realisation remains insufficient. Says Goethe speaking of
Faust attaining to heaven :
"Alles Vergangliche "All transiency
1st nur ein Gleichniss. But as a symbol is meant.
Das Unzulangliche.i Earth's insufficiency
Hier wird's Ereigniss." Here grows to event."
The unity of man's spiritual being, his soul, is just as much a
product of nature as another event or thing in the world. We
are built up of many souls and our souls in turn will be used for
building up future souls.
We might depict the origin of a soul as the conflux of events
by strands of lines, representing first at the moment of birth an
organism endowed with dispositions which are inherited from par-
ents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and all the other more re-
mote ancestors. They are slightly, and more or less, modified by
parental influences during the time of the mother's pregnancy.
With the moment of birth new sets of lines set in, producing not
mere dispositions, but well-defined and definite impressions, con-
crete structures, not only aptitudes for receiving impressions.
There are simple lines indicating the simple influences during the
period of babyhood, hunger and satiation, sensations of sound, of
light, of touch, of smell, of taste, of pain, now caused by injuries,
now by wants, the mother's soothing voice, the satisfaction of
wants,—then again a renewal of the want and the expectation of
its satisfaction by like means. All these events leave memory-
traces reawakened, when the occasion arises, by sense-impressions
the same or similar in kind.
I Umuldngliche is Goethe's own word. Bayard Taylor is justified in translating it by " in-
sufficient," for z«/a«^^« means " to suffice." But Goethe obviously did not mean that " the in-
sufficiency of life, of the transient phenomena of material existence, are actualised in the realm
of the eternal." He meant that the insufficiencies become complete, that we have here in heaven
the reality that heretofore appeared incomplete and insufficient on earth. It is not impossible
that Goethe, when speaking of das Unzuiiingliche, had in mind the notion of das Unerllingliche.
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In the second year a new factor tells on the young life—lan-
guage. Beginning to understand and repeat words, the infant
enters upon an inheritance that comes down to him from the re-
mote ages of the dawn of human aspirations. The civilisation of
the century is instilled into his soul by means of expressions and by
the example of manners. The child's spirit unfolds according to
the pattern set by his surroundings. He now begins to distinguish
himself from others and calls himself "I." It is the first dawn
of consciousness. What spiritual treasures are showered upon
him when fairy-tales are read to him, when he becomes acquainted
with brothers, sisters, parents, grandparents, cousins, friends ! and
what a vista of important considerations opens to him when he
encounters hostile elements, worries, sorrows, difficulties, cares,
testing his mettle and developing courage ! The school days widen
the horizon and intensify the troubles of life. The lines represent-
ing the influences of this period grow extremely complex and repre-
sent the quintessence of the souls of the greatest sages, the best
teachers, the boldest heroes of mankind. Foreign languages im-
part a great deal of the spirit of foreign nations and a comprehen-
sion of their noblest minds. Mathematics incorporates in the
mental system the maturest thoughts of the unknown masters to
whom Euclid owed his education, to Egyptian and Babylonian
geometricians, to Pascal, Vega, Napier, Newton, Euler, etc. His-
torical lessons set before his eyes the example of the noble, the
strong, the powerful. Sermons in church awaken religious reflex-
ions, and the egotistic tendency which has naturally developed with
the origin of the ego-conception receives a check by the teachings
of self-surrender, altruistic love, sacrifice, etc. The Christ-idea
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comes and the God-problem, the notion of the mysterious powers
that produce the world and regulate its course.
So far the receptive function was predominant, but soon when
the period of growth is complete the tables are turned. Seed-time
is over and the first fruits are being harvested. The most impor-
tant period begins with maturity, when the boy has become a man,
the girl a woman. New longings arise with puberty and life be-
comes serious. The young man must make a living, and the way
in which he responds to the needs of life continues to mould his
character and influence his soul. He marries and takes care of his
family; he educates his children and plans for their future, until
the day comes that he breaks down and dies.
We have so far only considered a diagram of lines entering
into the combination of strands representing the growth of a human
life; we must also contemplate the reverse of the medal. A hu-
man individual is like a living knot of strands in a large net. As
many threads as are gathered up in its make-up, so many and a
few more (for the fibres live and grow and multiply) emerge from
it. Every action has its reaction; and all the influences here at
work are spiritual factors.
Every single soul is a unity which possesses a character of its
own; it is a product of the past, having at its command the span
of a life to modify the past, to correct its faults, to work out its
blessings, to add to and increase transmitted knowledge, to accom-
plish useful deeds and work out its own salvation in its own'way.
While living out its own individuality, it shapes the future and
establishes itself as a new factor of life which will remain an in-
delible present for good or for evil, or for both, in all the genera-
tions to come. We live in our children, we live in our words, we
live in our works, we live wherever we leave a trace of our being.
And the spirit which animates our words, our works, and all other
traces of our being, is not merely the result of our life, or the in-
fluence of our soul, but our soul itself.
The reality of the soul is not annihilated when we understand
that the soul is not a substance but a spiritual presence. The re-
ligions of mankind inculcate the moral applications of the truth
that man's life does not cease with death, and if the allegories in
which their doctrines are popularly understood cannot be accepted
in the letter, they still remain true in the spirit. There is a hell of
the results of evil deeds, though it be not located underground,
and there is a heaven of the blessings of righteousness and moral
endeavor, though it must not be sought beyond the skies.
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The same is true of the God-idea. There is a power that
shapes our ends, roughhew them as we may. That power cannot
be an individuality such as are human beings, not an ideal creature,
not a world-monarch, delighting in the flattery of adoration, not a
physical begetter of the universe; it is more than all that. But
while God is not a concrete being, he is yet possessed of a distinct
character. He is not the vague idea of existence in general nor
the sum total of reality (as Pantheism represents him to be); God,
being the norm of existence and the ultimate authority for conduct,
is definite and his qualities can be ascertained. The conduct pre-
scribed by God cannot be mistaken, for his dispensation is every-
where the same. We need not call by the name of God the fac-
tors that shape the world, that create order, and regulate human
society; they remain real by whatever name we may be pleased to
call them. Our scientists catch glimpses of it when they formulate
natural laws and our moralists when they preach righteousness and
good will. Even the atheist helps to understand God better by
forcing the unthinking believer to revise his notion of God and
eliminate mythological features. The unity of the world-order is
real, its wholesomeness and goodness are true; why not call it God?
True, it differs in many respects from the popular God-conception,
but at bottom it is the same idea purified of popular misconcep-
tions in the furnace of science. It changes a mythological God
into the true God, recognising him as the superpersonal divinity
of the cosmic world-order, the Eternal, the Everlasting, the Omni-
present, the All-embracing, the Supreme Norm of Existence in
whom we all live and move and have our being.
Now, it is a fact that scientific progress is not at all welcome
in religious fields. Our religious sentiments are so intimately in-
terwoven with the symbolism of our creeds that we hate to see
them touched. We cling to the word, not to the sense, we quarrel
over letters and ignore their significance, and it is perhaps good
(or at least inevitable) that in the dogmatic period we exaggerate
the importance of the symbol, for we do not as yet understand its
meaning. The symbol in that period is all we possess of truth,
and with the symbol we would have lost its meaning.
Science always appears to the religious believer as a power of
destruction. The language of science is dry and cold and purely
spiritual, the style of religious symbolism is poetic and sensual. It
appeals to our imagination and pleases childlike natures. No
wonder that the mass of mankind, being sensual and being in need
of sensual imagery, shrink from the serene grandeur of science
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and condemn its truths as empty abstractions. It is a sign of men-
tal immaturity to be blind to the beauty and reality of truth in the
stern formulation of abstract statements, but it is not a fault of
science to be rebuked or censured.
Those of my critics who take this position I should vituperate
as little as I would blame children who prefer fairy-tales to math-
ematical theorems. The value of the latter will dawn upon some of
them, by no means upon all of them, in later life; and the beauty
of the former, of fairy-tales, will not fade, though their importance
may be eclipsed by the brighter light of genuine truth. Their all-
sufficiency only will be lost in the breadth of a scientific comprehen-
sion of the situation.
What then would be the use of quarrelling with critics from the
ranks of orthodox Christianity? From their own standpoint they
are right, and that another standpoint may be forced upon them in
due time they are incapable of comprehending, God bless them
in their faith. Their faith is the best surrogate of truth they can
have. They have the religion to which their mental size is adapted,
and (though I believe in progress and mental growth) I have come
to the conviction that every one's religion is shaped by his needs
on the basis of his insight. Accordingly every one has the religion
he deserves to have.
There are critics outside the pale of churches who find fault
with my book on other grounds. They speak of it as disappoint-
ing and contradictory. On the one side the materialists, who deny
the reality of ideas and everything ideal, think that I merely play
with words when I insist on the truth of immortality. Because
I reject the letter of the traditional dogma and the popular con-
ception of the soul, they would prefer to have me say bluntly that
there is no soul and consequently no immortality worth talking
about. On the other hand there are believers in spiritual sub-
stances who think that I overlook important considerations which
are apt to indicate the existence of a soul-entity. The existence
of the soul as form means nothing to them, and a purely spiritual
immortality is branded as the denial of any immortality, as much
so as the worship in spirit and in truth appeared to be an abolition
of all true worship to those who still believed in sacrifices upon an
altar reeking with blood.
With critics of this stamp I find no fault either. They are
right from their standpoint, but I have to add, they are wrong as
to facts. The materialists are wrong in identifying man with the
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heap of material atoms of which he happens to consist at a given
moment.
Man is the form of his life, the suchness of his existence, the
character of his being. At the moment of death man's body ceases
to be himself and turns into his remains,— a corpse, lifeless, void
of sentiment, stark and cold like a clod, with nothing human ex-
cept a reminiscence of his external shape which only serves to ren-
der it more awful and offensive to behold. The carcass is no longer
the man, it is offal, it is that which has been rejected, correspond-
ing to the slough of the snake, being the waste products of life.
But, says the materialist, if the corpse is not the man, then he has
disappeared and nothing is left. I agree with the materialist on
his own standpoint : nothing material, no bodily corporeality, is
left of the man that has died. But I add, the main part of the
man remains. It is not as if the man had never been. The essen-
tial features of his life continue and act as a real and indelible pres-
ence, a formative factor of a definite description, in the general
evolution of life, helping in its own way to shape the affairs of the
world.
So materialistic is man by nature, having received his first
education in the school of the senses, that he wants substance not
form, quantity not quality, amounts and masses not character.
Haji Abdu Al-Yasdi,^ the agnostic poet, exclaims in the Kasi-
dah, a Lay of the Higher Life :
"What see we here? Forms, nothing more!
Forms fill the brightest, strongest eye.
We know not substance ; 'mid the shades,
Shadows ourselves we live and die."
He takes substance as real and form as a mere shade, while
in fact substance is nothing but material, and there is nothing of
value that is not constituted by form.
Forms are the realities of life; forms alone possess signifi-
cance. Character, morality, ideals, have their conditions in the do-
main of form ; all work, all aspiration, all endeavor, is in its very
nature formative. Let us rejoice then that forms are real and that
the forms of our own being are preserved in the evolution of life.
Spiritualists, on the other hand, as the name is usually under-
stood, are the exact inverse of the materialists. While materialists
deny the reality of the spiritual, because it is not material but finds
expression in form, the spiritualists, convinced of the reality of the
spiritual, imagine that it must or ought to have a material exist-
I A nom de /•lunte of Sir Richard F. Burton.
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ence. They are, in this respect, like the materialists that think
whatever is real must be a substance of some kind. Spiritual sub-
stances may be as much more refined and sublimated as air is
thinner than clods of clay, but they are after all assumed to be
substances or entities. They have not as yet seriously investigated
the nature of the spiritual and think of it in terms of gaseous bodies
or ethereal action. Hence the important role that, as a rule, elec-
tricity plays in che minds of spiritualists. They speak of thought-
waves and conceive them after the analogy of electric phenomena
as being transmitted through the ether in the form of undulations.
Such theories in explaining mind-reading and thought-transfer-
ence are quite ingenious, but they are based upon a conception of
spirit which materialises the spiritual.
Materialistic and spiritualistic critics agree in this, that they
regard my terms and expressions as misleading or even contradic-
tory. They think that I should consistently deny the existence of
the soul and its immortality. They only prove that they have not
understood the author's meaning, for the comprehension of which
a certain mental and psychical maturity is indispensable. Those
who have not as yet faced the difficulty (or better, the impossibil-
ity) of thinking the soul as a substance or an entity, as a concrete
being, who naively take seriously the religious symbols in which
artists represent the impalpable spirit, will naturally think that all
the trouble is vain which I take to prove that the soul (though
not an entity) does truly and really exist. They think that I have
overlooked certain considerations which in their opinion are apt to
prove the existence of a soul-entity, and claim that there is much
more to be accounted for than is dreamt of in my philosophy. Cer-
tainly, my booklet does not exhaust the subject : there are addi-
tional problems to be investigated and the solution of the problem
of the nature of the soul leads to other problems which I have not
ventured to touch; but for that reason, my critics may be assured
that I have considered all the arguments which they refer to.
One of these sages, for instance, referring to the passage in
the preface (p. v) that "there is as little need for the psychologist
to assume a separate soul-being ... as there is for the meteor-
ologist to assume a wind-entity which by blowing produces a com-
motion in the air," adds:
" Obviously the cases are not parallel. The true argument would be that just
as there can be no air functions (or commotions of air) without the air which moves,
so there can be no soul-functions without the soul." '
1 Published in The Guardian, May 15, 1901, p. 658.
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To be sure there are conditions in which the soul manifests
itself ; there is a material world of action and reaction, there is a
bodily substratum for the display of mental activities. But as the
air is not the wind, so the bodily conditions and also the more
sublimated and hypothetical substratum cannot be called the soul.
Wind is a commotion of air, so soul is the character of feeling, of
thinking, of willing, of doing. Our soul is a complex organism
produced by definite conditions and the sum total of its functions
is the soul itself. If that statement is, as my sapient critic claims,
"equivalent to the denial of the existence of the soul," he ought to
say that a mechanic who explains the mechanism of a watch as a
certain combination of its parts so as to make it perform the work
of indicating the time, practically denies the existence of the watch.
My critic of course still cherishes the ideas of a materialistic
spiritualism which compares the soul to a body and its manifesta-
tions to physical functions, only that the soul-body is supposed to
consist of a sublimated spiritual substance, the nature of which is
and will ever remain a profound mystery. Obviously he has never
in his life faced the difficulties of the soul-problem ; he is fed on
the husks of mythology and is satisfied with the food adapted to
his stomach. He has nothing to learn from me. No wonder that
he "cannot conceive of the person who would be wiser for the
perusal of the book."
I grant to my critic that I frequently attach to terms and words
a new meaning which departs from the traditional definition; but
I do so on purpose and because I believe myself entitled to do so.
I follow in this practice the common method of all thinkers, only I
avoid equivocation by carefully indicating the new significance of
the old terms. I might as well have discarded the entire old
nomenclature and invented a new one, but I fear that no one will
take the trouble to study a new conception of the soul if he has to
forget the history of psychology and turn over a new leaf. Scien-
tists never discard the old terms, but pour new wine into old bot-
tles by giving a new interpretation to the traditional expressions.
Just as the soul was conceived by former psychologists as a
soul-being, so the fire was said to be a fire-entity, a phlogiston,
which manifested itself in certain functions such as heat and light.
But the idea of fire as a phlogiston has been surrendered, and yet
our physicists do not say that fire does not exist. They believe as
much as ever that fire burns ; then, why shall I not be entitled to
continue to say that the soul is real, and that the soul-functions
constitute the soul, although I have reached the point in my mental
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development in which I have learned to understand that there is
as little a soul-entity as there is a fire-stuff or phlogiston. I gladly
forgive my astute critic the severity and the high-handed self-suffi-
ciency with which he disposes of me, for he knows no better, and
to judge of a scientific conception of the soul is not given him.
Privately he may be, and in fact I trust that he is, a dear old soul
of a theologian who has preached many a good sermon to the edifi-
cation of his parishioners. I have too much of the theologian in
me, having myself passed through the phase in which he tarries
now, not to appreciate his zeal for the truth, i. e., for the truth as
he sees it.
Theology has become progressive of late. It has become an
historical science in its biblical studies and it will become philos-
ophy in its dogmatology, and a branch of natural science in psy-
chology and ethics. I confess that I am a theologian and my
endeavor is to dig down to the bedrock of fact upon which theol-
ogy as a science can find a safe foundation.
The immortality-conception advocated in Whence and Whither
has one advantage which cannot be underrated. It is true and
can be proved upon strict scientific evidence. It may not be satis-
factory to those who believe they are in need of a soul-entity, who
think that if their soul does not consist of a substance, they can
have no soul at all and their immortality would be a flimsy make-
shift : but they cannot say that it is untrue. They cannot deny
that our soul is actually formed first by the inheritance of disposi-
tions and then through education under the formative influence of
other souls. Nor can anything be gainsaid that in our recollec-
tions and reminiscences the souls of the dead remain living pres-
ences exercising a powerful influence upon our lives. In this sense
they become angels, i. e., spiritual guides, whose inspirations have
proved to be of the greatest importance. The dead have finished
their career; their course is run and all their troubles are over.
Theirs is a condition of Paradisian bliss and peace. Yet their use-
fulness is not gone: they continue to surround us and to comfort
us, and we deem the sentiment as expressed in many Church
hymns and poems, full of assurance of an immortality, not only
legitimate but even perfectly tenable from our own radical stand-
point; for instance, the consolation which Mr. Bonney offers in
the following words to a friend on the death of his wife
:
" And thy remaining days
Shall not be darker for her absence here,
But brighter for her smile from paradise,"
